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Abstract
The aim of the article is to explain the institutional development of the parliamentary scrutiny 
systems in Germany and the UK on the basis of existing Europeanization frameworks. So far these 
attempts have con-centrated on policy specific analyses or on the development of governmental or 
administrative structures. There has been no attempt to explicitly link the evolving discussion on 
the role of national Parliaments and the development of scrutiny structures to the theoretical debate 
about Europeanization and domestic change. We will apply a strict top down approach taking on 
board key notions of the Europeanization literature such as misfit, mediating factors or domestic 
change. However, in order to grasp the various dynamics at work we had to specify the existing 
frameworks. The rather undefined concept of 'misfit' between the European and national level is 
divided into three sub-categories: constitutional, functional and cultural misfit. This allows for a 
more differentiated analysis of how the various mediating factors exerted their influence on the 
development of the domestic institutions. Drawing on explanatory models from sociological as well 
as ra-tional choice institutionalism we argue that cultural factors such as the attitude towards 
European Integra-tion account for the longer term developments of the scrutiny systems whereas 
formal mediating institutions such as national Governments or Courts are responsible for the more 
abrupt changes. 
Kurzfassung
Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die institutionellen Entwicklungen der parlamentarischen 
Kontrollsysteme im deutschen Bundestag und dem britischen Unterhaus auf der Grundlage 
bestehender Europäisierungsansätze zu erklären. Während sich diese Ansätze bislang nahezu 
ausschließlich auf politikfeldspezifische Fragen oder der Analyse gouvernementaler Strukturen 
beschränkt haben, soll hier erstmals explizit die Debatte um die Rolle nationaler Parlamente mit der 
sich entwickelnden Europäisierungsliteratur verbunden werden. Dabei hat sich gezeigt, dass 
insbesondere das Konzept des ‚misfit' zu unbestimmt für die Analyse der Ent-wicklungslinien 
beider parlamentarischer Systeme waren. Deshalb wurde der Misfitbegriff in einen konsti-
tutionellen, funktionellen und kulturellen Aspekt unterteilt, um so zu einer differenzierteren 
Betrachtung der Einflüsse der verschiedenen intervenierenden Einflussfaktoren zu gelangen. 
Ausgehend von Erklärungsmo-dellen des soziologischen wie auch ‚rational choice' 
Institutionalismus argumentieren wir, dass insbesonde-re kulturelle Faktoren, wie die generelle 
Haltung zur europäischen Integration für die längerfristigen Ent-wicklungen der parlamentarischen 
Kontrollmechanismen maßgeblich sind, während formale institutionali-sierte Verhandlungsmacht 
sich in plötzlicheren Veränderungen niederschlägt.
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1 Introduction   
With the rise of the so-called ‘Future of Europe Debate’ and the intensified deliberations about the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union, national Parliaments have moved to the centre of 
interest and studies about the role of these institutions have increased in recent years (Maurer / 
Wessels 2001,Cygan 2001, Holzacker 2002, Hegeland / Neuhold 2002) . At the same time theory 
building in the field of European integration has moved to questions of how the process of European 
integration impacts on domestic political systems. Within the so-called ‘Europeanization’ literature
(1) several top down approaches have been developed, which present categories and concepts to 
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classic integration theories. These attempts, however, have concentrated on policy specific analysis 
or on the development of governmental or administrative structures (Héritier 2001, Lehmkuhl / Knill 
1999, Börzel 1999). So far there have not been any attempts to explicitly link the discussion on the 
role of national Parliaments and the development of scrutiny structures to the theoretical debate 
about Europeanization and domestic change.(2)  
This exactly will be the aim of this article. We will explain the institutional development of the 
parliamentary systems in two EU Member States on the basis of existing frameworks found in the 
Europeanization literature. Especially the frameworks of Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse as well as 
Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso will serve as a starting point for the 
analysis of the parliamentary scrutiny systems in Germany and the United Kingdom (Börzel / Risse 
2000, Risse et al. 2001). We will take on board their strict top down approach keeping the process of 
European integration as the independent variable(3) and will broadly follow their three step 
approach: First, the Europeanization process at EU level is identified. Then the ‘Goodness of Fit’ 
between this emerged structure and the domestic level, and the resulting adaptational pressure, is 
determined. Finally, so-called mediating factors present at the domestic level and their effect is 
analysed to understand the change or lack of change observed. However, in order to achieve an 
increased analytical leverage we will propose an adapted theoretical framework which serves the 
specific needs of a comparative polity analysis.  
In order to grasp the various dynamics at work we will break down the observed misfit between the 
relevant Europeanization process and the domestic parliamentary system into three categories: 
constitutional misfit, cultural misfit and functional misfit. This specification of the rather broad 
notion of ‘misfit’ will enable us to show that different adaptational pressures are at work on and 
within each of the two parliamentary systems.  
We will then analyse the impact of the adaptational pressures on each of the two parliamentary 
systems with a specific focus on the interplay between different mediating factors derived from 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Börzel / Risse 2000). It will be argued that in 
particular cultural factors such as the attitude towards European Integration but also formal 
mediating institutions such as national Governments or Courts account for the developments 
observed. Thereby, the cultural factors determine the longer term developments, whereas formal 
institutions are responsible for the more abrupt changes. Thus, we will challenge the most recent 
attempt by Dimitrakopoulos to explain parliamentary adaptation only by incrementalism and path 
dependence (Dimitrakopoulos 2001).  
Finally, a classification between a ‘systemic’ and an ‘intra-institutional’ change is offered not only to 
‘know change when we see it’ but also to assess its relevance for the institution as such and the 
domestic political system as a whole.  
2
These theoretical concepts will be applied in a comparative case study, in which the differences in 
the development of formal scrutiny rights in the House of Commons and the German Bundestag will 
be analysed. The study thereby follows the principle of a ‘most different system design’ which 
allows to compare cases, as contrasting as possible, in order to show the robustness of a relationship 
between dependent and independent variables (Landman 2000, 27). The parliamentary systems of 
Germany and Britain meet this prerequisite, especially in regards to European integration issues:  
Whereas the Federal Republic has been a ‘europhoric’ if only ‘semi-sovereign’ founding member of 
the EU with an unstable parliamentary tradition, the UK only joined in 1973 after a controversial 
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modern times (Bulmer / Burch 1999, 16). The organising principles of the parliamentary as well as 
of the state systems as a whole differ completely. Germany is a federal state with a tradition for both 
vertical and horizontal power sharing. The UK on the contrary is a unitary and centralised state (at 
least until the devolution process began).  
2 Mapping the Misfit   
2.1 Identification of the Europeanization process  
Identifying the Europeanization process is vital for any analysis of domestic change employing our 
framework. However, there is not only one specific Europeanization process that exerts pressure on 
the domestic level. Looking at the parliamentary systems in Germany and the UK two main 
processes can be identified, each with different implications for the Member State: the formal 
democratic deficit and the development of network governance on the European level.  
The evolvement of network governance is characterised by the diffusion of state power into networks 
outside parliamentary control. Even if this development is informal and thus harder to grasp 
analytically, there are substantial empirical indications showing that it is affecting the influence of 
the national Parliaments on EU matters (Kohler-Koch / Eising 1999, Jachtenfuchs 2001). The 
network development is, however, part of a larger ‘de-parliamentarisation’ tendency that can be 
traced back to before European integration, and which continues to be nourished by global 
developments as well as European.(4) If a Parliament is sidelined, and without influence on 
legislative decisions taken in networks, it cannot perform its functions properly. Europeanization, 
however, is only one factor among many that enhances the existing network development. In order 
not to overstretch the concept of Europeanization (Radaelli 2000), we will leave the analysis of the 
network development aside and will instead concentrate our efforts on more formal aspects of an 
increasing democratic deficit.  
The formal democratic deficit is most frequently discussed when national Parliaments’ relations to 
Europe are on the agenda. It has been defined in a variety of ways, employing different 
understandings of democracy, and emphasising the role of different actors. Raunio and Hix refer to 
the ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit as a development on the European level which has 
led to an erosion of parliamentary control over the executive office-holders – both constitutionally 
and politically (Raunio / Hix 2000, 142). This means that the inter-institutional balance on the 
national level has been altered by the process of European integration leaving national parliaments in 
a weaker position compared to the status quo ante. Other scholars place more emphasis on the 
lacking counterweight presented by the European Parliament in European Union decision-making 
(Featherstone 1994, 150).  
Common among most of the interpretations is that they point to national Parliaments as losers or 
more recently as latecomers to the EU policy making process (Maurer / Wessels 2001, Chryssochoou 
1998, 31-32). We identify five developments on the European level which potentially influence the 
inter-institutional balance at the expense of national Parliaments, thus creating adaptational pressures 
on these institutions to secure their traditional role within the respective political systems.  
3
1. The general shift in decision-making power to the European level has lead to a decrease in 
Parliaments’ ability to influence political outcomes and to control their governments. When 
decisions are taken at the European level, national Parliaments loose the final say on 
Seite 3 von 21 EIoP: Text 2002-015: Full Text
30.09.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-015.htmlegislative decisions. They are left with the possibility to influence their government, which 
exercises the legislative powers in the Union together with 14 other governments and the 
European Parliament.  
2. Almost every Treaty change since the EU’s creation has resulted in a widening of its policy 
remit. From its initial role as an economic community, it is now playing a role in decisions 
covering all aspects of society.(5)  
3. The increasing use of QMV after the Single European Act meant, that the ability of national 
Parliaments, to force governments to make ex ante commitments or to veto European 
legislation vanished.  
4. The introduction and the increased use of the Co-decision procedure after the Maastricht 
Treaty puts additional pressure on the parliamentary scrutiny systems (Maurer / Wessels 2001, 
42). The procedure introduces additional stages at which a legislative act may need to be 
examined by the national Parliaments (i.e. after the conciliation phase), thus further 
complicating their scrutiny task.  
5. The enforcement of the European Parliament, which is aimed at strengthening the element of 
representative democracy within the EU system, could – from the perspective of a national 
Parliament – only be regarded as an inadequate compensation. This is not only because the 
EP’s competences are only limited in comparison to national Parliaments, but also because the 
representation of national constituencies is incomparable as well.  
Whereas this process of Europeanization on the European level determines the kind of pressure 
exerted on all political systems of the Member States, since it potentially alters the inter-institutional 
balance between legislature and executive, it depends on the domestic structures of each of the 
Member States how strong the pressure for change finally is.  
2.2 Breaking down the Misfit   
The degree of fit between the process of Europeanization on the European level and existing 
structures at the domestic level determines the degree of ‘adaptational pressure’ on the Member 
State. The lower the degree of fit, the higher the adaptational pressure (Risse et al. 2001, 8). The 
conceptualisation of fit and misfit is of great importance in explaining the different outcomes across 
the EU. Since the structures at the domestic level vary among the different Member States, the 
degree of fit, and the following adaptational pressure will vary as well (Risse et al. 2001, 7).  
Risse et al. identify two different forms of misfit: a ‘policy misfit’ between EU regulation and 
domestic policies which leads to an adaptational pressure e.g. to reform a procedure. Secondly, direct 
adaptational pressure on domestic institutional structures, e.g. to reform Central Bank regulations to 
achieve the required degree of independence from government. Whereas the policy misfit can be a 
fairly obvious affair, e.g. compliance with a certain set of standards, the misfit between a domestic 
polity and the Europeanization process can be a highly complex relation in which it can be difficult 
to identify which kind of misfit exerts which kind of adaptational pressure. This is particularly the 
case when the domestic polity in question, is deeply culturally and historically embedded at the 
national level such as national Parliaments.  
More precise parameters are therefore needed. We propose to break down a generally identified 
misfit into three sub-categories, each representing distinct elements of the general misfit which can 
be developed to very different degrees. This allows for a far more nuanced investigation into the 
interplay between the European and the domestic level.  
4
2.2.1 The Constitutional Misfit: Parliamentary traditions and Formal scrutiny systems   
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to norms, traditions and principles that represent important characteristics of the institution laid down 
either explicitly in an constitutional document or passed on in constitutional tradition. They can be of 
a managerial kind (e.g. relation to other institutions) or related to the institution’s steering principles 
(e.g. different variants of democratic representation). In the case of Parliaments it concerns for 
example the right of timely information, consultation and decision-making powers over the 
government when acting at the EU level.  
In the UK, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty was at the heart of the debate between 
opponents and advocates over British accession to the EC in the early 70s. It means two things: 
firstly, that a law enacted by parliament overrides any other source of law. Secondly, that no 
Parliament can bind its successor (George 1992, 98). Dicey, the most renowned exponent of the 
doctrine, called it ”the dominant characteristic of our political institutions” and ”the very keystone of 
the law of the constitution” (A. Dicey, quoted in Page 1996, 32). Over the years it has achieved a 
high symbolic value as a carrier of liberty and ‘Britishness’ and has formed an integral part of the 
British conception of national sovereignty (Armstrong / Bulmer 1996, 259). It is therefore not 
surprising that challenging this principle can be viewed as a threat to the British nation-state identity 
as well. The notion of parliamentary sovereignty, however, conflicted with key features of 
Community law. Already in 1964, with the Costa vs. ENEL case, the European Court of Justice had 
enunciated the bearing principle of Community law, namely that it has primacy over national law. 
This constituted an almost complete misfit and the adaptational pressure was therefore relentless.  
Another constitutional misfit between the Europeanization process and the British parliamentary 
system can be found in the formal scrutiny system. British politics has been characterised by very 
strong executives that have even been labelled ‘elected dictatorships’. The House of Commons has 
been given little influence on the control and shaping of policy. This is primarily explained by the 
fact that most governments - as a result of the first past the post electoral system - are one-party 
majority governments. As long as they can rely on party support they are in a position to control the 
work of the House. Secondly, the centralised character of the unitary state gives the governments an 
almost absolute power. There is no tradition of horizontal power sharing. Few agencies have 
possessed an effective autonomy and the cabinet is characterised by tight discipline and strict 
coordination mechanisms. On the vertical level, the power used to be concentrated in the central 
government, with only little influence given to local or regional governments (Armstrong / Bulmer 
1996, 259). All together, these elements make up a very powerful executive that has not been 
generous in handing away scrutiny rights. When the process of Europeanization increases the power 
of the executive in relation to the parliament, it thus makes even more apparent the lack of formal 
parliamentary scrutiny.  
This adds up to a rather ambiguous misfit. The reinforcement of the government cannot be regarded 
as a misfit that presses for change since it only strengthens an existing situation. For the Parliament, 
however, the constitutional misfit is significant as it is loosing even more possibilities to influence 
the government. Thus, the adaptational pressure for a change in the political system as a whole has 
not been high. The pressure for the rather weak House of Commons to develop effective control 
tools for decisions that are increasingly taken outside its ‘normal’ sphere of influence was very high 
indeed, in order to re-establish at least the former inter-institutional balance.  
In Germany there was no similar tradition to the parliamentary sovereignty of the British system. The 
aim of the victorious parties when drawing up the German Basic Law after WWII was to avoid the 
re-emergence of a strong central power. Thus a political system was created characterised by a strong 
division of power both vertically through the involvement of the Bundesrat and horizontally by 
independent institutions such as the Federal Bank and the Federal Constitutional Court.  
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This power dispersal characteristic for the German federal system prevented the government from 
obtaining the same position as in Britain. The ‘built in’ counterweight to the process of stronger 
executives brought about by European integration was, however, not complemented by strong 
control mechanisms after the Federal Republic had joined the EC. Within the Bundestag debates on 
EU affairs have been infrequent and a scheduled annual debate does not always take place. ‘Written 
question’ (kleine Anfragen) and ‘written questions followed by short debate’ (grosse Anfragen) are 
used, but question time is not of central importance (Bulmer / Paterson 1987, 172). These 
instruments are mainly used by the opposition and to a far lesser extent the parliamentary majority, 
or the legislature as a whole. However, since no real opposition existed on EU affairs, these control 
instruments have rarely been used (Hölscheidt 2001, 133).  
Since the scrutiny system within the Bundestag only developed very slowly, this major constitutional 
misfit of missing counterweights to governmental power pertained for the first 35 years of German 
EU membership.  
2.2.2 The Functional Misfit: a Speaking and a Working Parliament   
The functional misfit covers the practical organisation of the work within the institution. This can be 
the difference between a hierarchical and a more horizontally managed organisation. The factors 
covered by the functional misfit are decisive for the range of options readily available for the 
institution when encountering adaptational pressure. In the case of Parliaments this concerns the 
internal organisation between the plenary and committees, the committee structure or the formalised 
role of party fractions.  
Westminster was, and to a lesser extent still is, characterised by a relatively low level of 
institutionalisation. It has been characterised as a ‘speaking parliament’ (Armstrong / Bulmer 1996, 
274), in which deliberation and debate dominate the work of the MPs. As a chamber-oriented 
institution it had made little use of committees such as permanent committees, which did not exist on 
specific subject matters when Britain joined the EC (Norton 1996, 103-104).  
The non-existent permanent committee system meant a lack of expertise and independent technical 
advice. This starved the House of information and hampered its ability to call the executive to 
account. Thus, this tradition made it ill prepared to handle the increasing inflow of technical 
legislative acts that started to arrive following accession to the EC, and thus aggravated the 
asymmetric relationship with the executive which can be regarded as a high degree of misfit.  
Contrary to the ‘speaking’ tradition of the House of Commons, the Bundestag has always had a well 
institutionalised committee system which has taken up a central place in the policy-making process. 
Members of the Bundestag spend the majority of their parliamentary time on committee work. This 
is radically different from the situation in the House of Commons, where it has been difficult at times 
to recruit people to committee work. The committees make up the main problem solving mechanism 
in the Bundestag. Here a large part of the disputes between government and opposition are settled, 
which to some extent make them the actual decision-making locus of the Bundestag. With the 
European Affairs Committee as a notable exception, the committees’ remits run parallel to that of the 
ministries.  
Whereas the election system in the UK favours candidates that are able to build up a relation with the 
constituency, the German system facilitates the election of specialists. The regional lists enable the 
party to put forward candidates who will perform well in committees. This, in combination with the 
specialist and depoliticised nature of the committee work, means that the Bundestag is rather well 
equipped to handle the scrutiny of even complex legislative processes (Bulmer 1986, 213 – 215). 
The functional misfit between the challenges of the Europeanization process and the internal 
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2.2.3 The Cultural Misfit: Adversarial and Cooperative Political Culture   
The cultural misfit finally covers the political culture within the institution. A confrontational and a 
cooperative culture respectively determine whether the European policy making style can be 
integrated into the working modes of the institution. For Parliaments, this in particular influences the 
ability to effectively scrutinise the government’s policy towards the EU.  
Not once since WWII has there been a coalition government in Britain. This is a result of the first-
past-the-post electoral system, which tends to produce clear majorities in the House, making policy-
making in Britain an adversarial exercise. The sitting order of the House of Commons and its almost 
ritual debating style clearly symbolise this. In the UK, coalition building and cooperation with the 
opposition is regarded as an aberration. This adversarial political culture prevents a united legislature 
from employing its power towards the executive, since debates, even at committee level, are shaped 
by the party cleavage.  
A telling example of this is the British ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. When John Major 
negotiated the Maastricht Treaty in 1990-1991, his government had a ruling majority of only 21 
mandates and it could be put in jeopardy by Euro-sceptic dissenters in the Conservative group. 
Although Labour supported the Maastricht Treaty, it chose to ”act its institutional role of seeking the 
governments defeat” (Kassim 2000, 42). In the end, Major was forced to use his final call, a 
confidence vote in Parliament, in order to get his majority. The misfit between the cooperative 
consensus-oriented policy-making on the European level and the adversarial political culture in the 
UK weakens Westminster’s ability to exercise effective scrutiny. As long as the scrutiny process is 
still primarily dominated by party cleavages, it lacks – from the perspective of the parliament – the 
effectivity a more unified approach towards the government could entail. The adaptational pressure 
on the Parliament was therefore high even in a cultural respect.  
The German political system, on the contrary, is characterised by a co-operative political culture, 
which has been an essential prerequisite for a productive interplay between the various institutions 
on the horizontal as well as on the vertical level. It has even been regarded as a prerequisite for this 
system of ‘political intervoweness’ to function smoothly (Börzel 1999).  
In the legislative process the informal consultation process begins very early for the governing 
parliamentary party groups. Contacts between the parliamentary group and the various ministries 
involved flourish. Experts in the parliamentary groups are consulted by ministerial officials, and 
parliamentarians get information about coming government positions while they are still developing. 
The committees elaborate their opinions in consultation with ministerial representatives and sessions 
are not necessarily characterised by a government versus opposition conflict. Majorities across party 
lines are not unusual. The non-partisan style of committee work and the willingness of the 
government parties to make concessions result in about 60 percent of all bills being amended at 
committee stage.(6) In more politicised questions, however, a relatively high degree of party 
discipline in the Bundestag would assure that backbenchers stayed in line even in the committees.  
As a reflection of its election system, Germany invariably has coalition governments. Although the 
party structure is dominated by the two biggest parties, they have both been dependent on small 
coalition partners to assure a majority in the Bundestag.  
Thus, there has not really been a misfit between the cooperative culture in the German political 
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been compared to the equally complex EU decision-making. Unlike the adversarial British political 
culture, the German tradition is therefore not conceived of as causing any problems. Thus there is a 
lack of adaptational pressure.  
7
3 Explaining Domestic Change   
3.1 Rational Choice and Sociological Mediating Factors  
The adaptational pressures exerted by Europeanization are a necessary, but not in itself sufficient 
condition for causing changes at the domestic level. The argument is that without misfit there is no 
pressure, and without pressure there is no change – a hypothesis which itself needs to be tested 
empirically. But whether change actually occurs is dependent on a number of mediating factors at the 
domestic level. Risse et al. distinguish between three structural factors (Multiple veto points, 
Mediating formal institutions and Political and organizational culture) and two factors relating to 
agency (Differential empowerment of actors and Learning) which they draw from rational choice as 
well as from sociological institutionalism.(7)  
Adaptational pressure can make formal institutions, whether intended or not, affect domestic actors’ 
ability to induce change. They can facilitate change or they can act as ‘veto players’. Thus Multiple 
veto points and Mediating formal institutions are conceptualised by Risse et al. as asserting their 
effects in opposite directions. Common for the two are that they work according to the ‘logic of 
consequentialism’. They do not affect the actors’ view on a situation, but they empower certain 
actors or hinder their possibility to change the existing structure (Risse et al. 2001, 9-10). As the 
analysis will show, both of the mediating factors can work in favour as well as against domestic 
change depending on the respective situation. It is therefore not correct to make this a priori 
distinction.  
On the other hand, the collective understandings of proper behaviour, existing procedures, norms and 
traditions embedded in institutions affect whether domestic actors can use adaptational pressure to 
induce change. A given organizational culture defines a set of borders inside which the actors can 
legitimately pursue their interests. This happens according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’. Action is 
rule based, and follows a role or identity that fits the specific situation (Risse et al. 2001, 10). In 
principle Europeanization can, according to the framework, lead to such changes in the interests and 
identities of the involved actors through a process of learning. Institutions like Parliaments, however, 
with a long legacy, deep roots in the political system and strong symbolic value, have a high 
resistance to adaptational pressure. Therefore it can be expected that political culture such as the 
general attitude towards European integration will be of significant importance in allowing or 
preventing adaptational pressure to transform into domestic change.  
3.2 Systemic and (Intra-)institutional change   
It is one thing to detect a Europeanization process and a misfit between domestic and European 
structures, but another to identify what consequences it may have; what exactly the adaptational 
pressures press for. Risse et al. mention two kinds of change: Similar ‘policy results’, as when an EU 
directive sets a certain standard that must be achieved and ‘structural isomorphism’, as when formal 
and informal institutional structures undergo change in order to achieve a certain goal.  
Risse et al. are only interested in the latter type of change, but underline the importance of a 
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outcomes, sector-specific institutional structures, and ”system-wide” political, economic and social 
structures (Risse et al. 2001, 15).  
Since this categorisation is clearly linked to a policy analysis, we propose two new categories to 
identify and to classify the different changes we encounter in our analysis. Risse et al. see domestic 
change in relation to the Europeanization process. We find it more useful to look at change in 
relation to the original institutional setting as well. Additionally, we propose to classify change not 
only by its narrow impact on the institution but also on the political system as a whole:  
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1. Systemic change covers a situation where structures or norms that encompass the political 
system are changed at large. This concerns the power balance between institutions for example 
or the constitutional standing of an institution as such or the political culture of a political 
system. For a change to be considered system-wide it must have a transformational nature 
going beyond the existing logic of the institutional set-up.  
2. Intra-institutional change on the other hand covers alterations in the internal working mode of 
an institution, the way things are handled or in what way decisions of the Parliament are 
prepared. Contrary to the system-wide change, intra-institutional changes are not directly 
influencing the inter-institutional balance. However they still can be of a profound nature and 
might be an important prerequisite for parliaments ability to exercise its competencies.  
3.3 The Adaptation Process in the United Kingdom   
3.3.1 Mediating Formal Institutions and the Departure from Parliamentary Sovereignty  
UK accession to the EC, and the adoption of the European Communities Act, were preceded by 
stormy debates in the House of Commons, with the euro-sceptic Labour party strongly opposing both 
membership and the way the government handled the negotiations. However, a simple majority in 
parliament was all it formally took to send Britain into the Communities. No constitutional court that 
had to give consent, no second chamber had to be consulted, and no constitutional obligations to seek 
a public mandate in the form of a referendum before handing over sovereignty to the EC needed to 
be satisfied (Dinan 1999, 64-66). This low number of veto points made it relatively easy for the 
government to induce change which constituted a breach with the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the UK.  
Still, the European Communities Act has been called ‘a masterpiece of drafting’ (Munro 1996, 86). 
While it de facto accepted the primacy of Community law, its formulation was sufficiently murky to 
leave the question of the future binding of parliament formally unresolved (Page 1996, 33). 
However, the fact that British courts on several occasions such as the Simmental case (1978) acted as 
facilitating formal institutions and set aside domestic legislation in favour of Community law was, 
however, regarded as the ‘death knell of parliamentary sovereignty’ (Munro 1996, 88, Page 1996, 
44).  
Thus, the formal facilitating institutions of the government and the national courts played the 
decisive role in inducing this abrupt system change that altered the constitutional standing of the 
House of Commons within the political system of the UK as a response to the huge adaptational 
pressure from the European level.  
3.3.2 Cross-Party Euroscepticism and the Introduction of Formal Ratification Rights   
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parties were of vital importance in the strife of the legislature for compensation. The British 
Parliament never had the same degree of control on foreign policy as in the domestic arena., since 
international treaties have always been considered an executive act (Page 1996, 32-34). Unlike in 
other European countries, there is no general constitutional rule in Britain that requires the 
legislator’s consent to international treaties. However, the making of treaties does not alter national 
law until they are incorporated into the law by the intervention of, or under the authority of, the 
Parliament. Although this provision guarantees that Parliament has the last say over treaty based 
changes in the national legislation, other aspects, like changes in the institutional set-up on the 
European level, which also cause pressures on the national level, did not fall within this category. 
This problem first became salient in 1978 before the decision about a direct election of the European 
Parliament was taken. When the European Parliamentary Elections Act was passed, the Labour 
government sought to assuage fears amongst its own party’s backbenchers by guaranteeing that ”no 
treaty which provides for an increase in the powers of the European Parliament shall be ratified by 
the United Kingdom unless it has been approved by an Act of Parliament.” (Munro 1996, 91).  
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With this constitutional novelty, Westminster could again win more formal control rights. The clause 
came of use with the ratification of the Single European Act as well as the Treaty on European 
Union. Since both Treaties provided for an increase in the European Parliament’s power, the 
government was obliged to obtain an approving Act from Parliament. Under the Major government 
the ratification rights of the Parliament were strengthened even more. This again owes directly to the 
internal party struggles caused by dissident Conservative Euro-sceptics. When the Conservative 
government went from a majority of 88 seats down to 21 in the 1992 election it put the decisive 
group of Euro-sceptic backbenchers – the so-called ‘Bruges group’ (Ware 1996, 251) - in a very 
powerful position (Kassim 2000, 42). Major, in the end, was forced to use the ”suicide threat of a 
vote of confidence” to bring his party rebels into line (Munro 1996, 91-92). One of the 
compensations given in the end was the provision concerning EMU in the European Communities 
Act. It stated that the government could not give notification of its intention to move to the third 
stage of the EMU unless a draft of the notification had first been approved by an Act of Parliament 
(Page 1996, 36). This concession marked a strengthening of the ratification rights of the House of 
Commons. Thus the cultural mediating factor of a cross-party-Eurosceptic attitude was the decisive 
driving force behind the strengthening of Westminster by successively introducing formal 
ratification rights.  
3.3.3 The Development of Formal Scrutiny Rights   
The Euro-sceptic political culture and the existence of intra-party oppositions in EU affairs have 
played the decisive role in the transformation of misfit into domestic changes in the British scrutiny 
system as well. Both the Conservatives and Labour have been internally split over the question of 
European integration even before the European Communities were created (Norton 1996, 94).  
The history of the development of a formal scrutiny system of EU affairs in Westminster itself is one 
of a great number of initial changes followed by a long period of rather insignificant incremental 
adjustments. Unlike the United States’ Congress or the German Bundestag for example, the House of 
Commons did not have permanent subject-matter committees prior to accession. When bills required 
detailed consideration, they were referred to ad hoc committees that ceased to exist as soon as they 
had reported back to the full House. Before entering the EC, it was therefore widely accepted, by 
Parliament as well as by government, that procedures in the House had to be profoundly revised. 
However, differences between opponents and proponents of EC membership prevented a mechanism 
to scrutinise Community legislation being set-up prior to accession. At the 1971 motion, principally 
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Conservatives broke the party line and voted against. The vote on the second reading of the 
European Communities Act only succeeded because the government made it a vote of confidence, 
and even then, 15 Conservatives voted against and five abstained (Norton 1996, 94). It took two 
reports of an especially established Select Committee – named after its chairman Sir John Foster - to 
define the fundamental changes in the handling of EC legislation (House of Commons 2000b, 4).  
Finally, after a generally Euro-sceptic Labour minority government took office in February 1974, the 
motion to appoint a new committee, the Committee on European Secondary Legislation Etc, was 
agreed, implementing a large part of the recommendations from the two Foster reports (Baines 1996, 
56-57). The creation of a permanent Scrutiny Committee that met once a week when Parliament was 
sitting and which was given all the normal powers of a select committee, was a true institutional 
innovation in the House of Commons (Rasmussen 2001, 158). Whereas the euro-sceptic cleavage, 
and the controversy over accession in general meant that the scrutiny system got a slow take-off it 
was also the reason why so fundamental intra-institutional changes were realised.  
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Next to these structural changes, the government accepted on an informal basis a constraint under 
which British ministers undertook not to agree to any legislative proposal in the Council until it had 
passed scrutiny. This caused considerable troubles in the beginning because the backlog of 
Commission proposals awaiting scrutiny meant that items were selected for debate in the House that 
had already been decided on in the Council (George 1992, 93). This experience spurred a debate over 
the functioning of the Committee and as a result the Procedure Committee, in autumn 1975, 
recommended that the documents, which the European Secondary Legislation Committee Etc 
considered should be subject to further scrutiny, were referred to a standing committee where they 
could be debated more thoroughly.  
After the change of government in 1979, the scrutiny system was debated again and the above-
mentioned government undertaking, which had hitherto been ‘voluntary’, was framed as the so-
called Scrutiny Reserve Resolution and agreed to in October 1980. This strengthened the House’s 
rights at least symbolically, since in certain cases ministers could still neglect the resolution (Munro 
1996, 94). However, the improved scrutiny capacity of the House was by far outweighed by the 
changes in the decision-making processes introduced in the Single European Act.  
In the 90s only smaller changes were introduced in the existing scrutiny system. One of the more 
remarkable was the creation of two (later extended to three) European Standing Committees. 
Documents, which the European Legislation Committee recommended for debate, would 
automatically be referred to one of these two standing committees. Furthermore, the scrutiny reserve 
resolution was reinforced twice (1990, 1998)(8) and the committee was renamed to the ‘European 
Scrutiny Committee’ (Select Committee on European Legislation 1998, Appendix 1, para. 22).  
All in all, it can be concluded that the changes made in the scrutiny system directly reflected 
resistance from Euro-sceptic backbenchers over the inadequacy of the exiting system. Thus, the 
mediating influence of a stable cross-party Eurosceptic attitude towards Europe transformed 
continously the existing misfit into changes. These changes are not merely an path dependent 
development, as Dimitrakopoulos (2001) has argued, but innovative outcomes were developed as 
well under adaptational pressure.  
3.3.4 Systemic and Intra-institutional Change in the UK   
As is obvious from the analysis, the adaptational pressures have had effect. The departure from the 
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order that breached with a century-old tradition in the UK. Likewise, the compensation through the 
introduction of formal ratification rights on treaties, has to be regarded as a constitutional innovation 
in the British political system which had systemic effects as well. Beginning with the reforms 
introduced immediately upon accession, the House of Commons has succeeded in expanding its 
scrutiny remit continuously over the years. Especially the introduction and expansion of the scrutiny 
reserve was part of a development, moderating the asymmetric power balance between executive and 
legislature, however not altering the systemic structures at large.  
Internally, House of Commons did not have permanent subject matter committees prior to EC 
accession. When the Committee on European Secondary Legislation Etc started its work in 1974 it 
was a parliamentary novelty, challenging the British tradition as a chamber oriented speaking 
parliament. Whereas some see the development of the scrutiny system in the House of Commons as 
relatively insignificant adjustments, others argue that even a gradual change over a 25-year period is 
impressive in a country where centuries of tradition make all change remarkable (Rasmussen 2001, 
161). Regardless of its political importance, it is a fact that accession to the EC, and the ongoing 
Europeanization process was the direct reason why the creation of an inherently different procedure 
was possible.  
No change in the political culture has been observed as a result of the adaptational pressures on the 
UK. The adversarial political culture is a product of the one-party governments, which again stems 
from the electoral system which is deeply embedded. Even if there have been tendencies towards the 
departure from a purely majoritarian system in European and sub-national elections, these tendencies 
are not clearly linked to the process of Europeanization.  
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3.4 The Adaptation Process in Germany   
3.4.1 The Permissive Consensus and the Absence of a Scrutiny System  
The scrutiny system in the Bundestag only developed very slowly between 1957 and 1991. We argue 
that this was mainly due to the pro-European consensus in the Bundestag, which was even seen as 
integral part of the German ‘Raison d’Etat’ after the second world war.  
In Article 2 of the Act of Ratification of the Treaty of Rome only an unbinding provision was made 
ensuring continuous information of the Bundestag by the government. In complete contrast to the 
struggles EC accession provoked in the UK the euphoria over the advancing European integration 
meant that the Bundestag was content even with these limited scrutiny rights (Schweitzer 1990, 168). 
Unlike in the UK, there has thus been no incompatibility between European integration and German 
self-conception. Throughout most of the process of European integration there has existed a national 
(elite) consensus on the desirability of German participation. From the 1960’s onwards no opposition 
to European integration worth mentioning has been represented in the Bundestag. The European 
policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was either raised above party dispute or displayed a large 
degree of interparty agreement, not least because the government in office collaborated with 
parliamentarians of all party groups (Schweitzer 1990, 48). Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) have 
named this a ‘permissive consensus’ which left the government with a wide room of manoeuvre in 
European Affairs. Even today not a single significant party in the Bundestag can be characterised as 
anti-European or even Euro-sceptic (Hölscheidt 2001, 117).  
Up until 1979, the compulsory dual mandate, that the Members of the European Parliament 
simultaneously held membership of the Bundestag, still ensured a flow of information from the 
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recommend the Bundestag to adopt a resolution on Commission proposals, but the government was 
not obliged to take these resolutions into account.  
After the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 the number of dual mandates 
rapidly decreased, and in 1983 hardly any were left. This caused the need for a body in the 
Bundestag that could cooperate with the European Parliament, and in 1983, the ‘Europa-
Kommission’ was set up. It did not have the status of a committee, and was thus not permitted to 
submit recommendations for decisions to the Bundestag. An initiative aimed at institutionalising and 
strengthening its position was rejected, and the Commission was abolished in 1987 (Hölscheidt 
2001, 125). In May the same year the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Sub-committee on EC Affairs 
was created. Its function was primarily to do ”groundwork” for the powerful Foreign Affairs 
Committee, and its scope for performing effective scrutiny was consequently severely limited 
(Saalfeld 1996, 22). In general, the scrutiny procedure was characterized by late and insufficient 
information and a selective approach by the Bundestag towards EC legislation (Bila 1998, 2-5). The 
Bundestag did not have the force, unity or incentive to constrain the increasing power of the 
government (Rometsch 1996, 62).  
We consider this ‘permissive consensus’ as the main reason why the parliamentary scrutiny 
procedure developed so slowly and within the ‘limited ideological space’(Bulmer 1986, 23) that is 
characteristic for the German party system. Moreover, the main players’ interest in maintaining 
status quo preserved the inertia in the system. The shifting governments saw their interest in avoiding 
a specialised committee, since the segregation of information served them according to a ‘divide and 
rule’ logic. The departmental standing committees on their part defended their ‘property rights’ and 
they fought to avoid that an EU Committee being set up that would cut into their jurisdiction 
(Saalfeld 1996, 31). Besides the decisive mediating factor of a broad pro-European political culture 
change was also hampered by the existence of a number of veto-players as well.  
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3.4.2 Mediating Formal Institutions and the Creation of the German Scrutiny System   
Nevertheless, after the 1985 White Book on the Internal Market and the ratification of the SEA it 
became impossible to ignore that the process of European Integration posed severe problems for the 
democratic accountability of decisions taken at the European level. Following dissatisfaction in the 
Länder, the Bundesrat, for the first time, made use of its veto right on Treaty changes, and pressed 
the government to get more influence (Börzel 1999, 584). Thus the Bundesrat played a crucial role as 
a formal mediating institution making change in the Bundestag possible by breaking the path for 
further scrutiny rights. From approaching European policy as an area exclusively belonging to the 
domain of the executive, the Bundestag started to see it as an important part of everyday politics that 
reached beyond the ‘permissive consensus’ on European affairs. This can be regarded as a process of 
Learning.  
As a result, the Committee on European Affairs was set up in September 1991 even though the 
‘Europeanists’ in the Bundestag fought hard against the changes (Rometsch 1996, 70). Thus, thirty-
four years after the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, a genuine Committee on European Affairs 
was finally created (Bila 1998, 8). Despite its competences to adopt resolutions on Commission 
proposals insofar as no other committee was competent, the Committee did not fulfil expectations 
(Hilf/ Burmeister (1996), 67-68). It did not succeed in finding its own place alongside the powerful 
Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs Committees and was therefore rarely given responsibility for 
cases of particular importance (Bila 1998, 6).  
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Federal Court played in the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. A former 
German official in the European-Commission argued that the Maastricht Treaty failed to obey the 
democratic standards required by the Basic Law and filed a case (Boom 1995, 5). By declaring the 
case admissible, the Constitutional Court, intentionally or not, became a key actor in the 
development of formal scrutiny rights in the Bundestag. The pending case put a lot of pressure on the 
government, for whom it was an unacceptable prospect that the Maastricht Treaty should be judged 
unconstitutional after it had been through ratification in the Parliament. The set-up of the Special 
Committee in October 1992 showed how seriously the government approached the situation. The 
Committee was created with the specific purpose of paving the way for the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Within six weeks the Committee dealt not only with the ratification, but also with 
the amendments to the Basic Law, which were considered necessary. The Constitutional Court thus 
played a vital role as a catalyst for domestic change by literally forcing the government to take 
serious the Bundestag’s lack of formal scrutiny rights, and thus acted as formal mediating institution. 
Two articles amended in December 1992 are of particular importance for the scrutiny system of the 
German Bundestag: Article 23, the so-called ‘Article on Europe’ (Hilf/ Burmeister 1996, 69) and the 
related Article 45.  
Article 23 considerably extended the scope for influence for the Bundestag on European legislation. 
It gives detailed provisions for the decision-making procedure in European affairs in the Parliament 
and stipulates that the government is obliged to inform the Bundestag ”comprehensively and as 
quickly as possible”. For the first time the Basic Law acknowledges the right of the Bundestag to 
influence the shaping of European legislation, before it is adopted in the Council of Ministers. An 
Act of Cooperation between the government and the Bundestag on European matters further 
specifies that the opinion given by the Bundestag shall be the basis for the negotiation position of the 
government (Bila 1998, 8-9)  
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Article 45 can be seen as a complement to article 23. It provides the constitutional basis for the 
appointment of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union (the EU Committee). As a 
constitutional novelty the EU Committee can, under certain rather demanding conditions, be 
authorized by the plenary of the Bundestag to take the role of the Bundestag as a whole in relation to 
the government and state opinions directly (Bila 1996, 27). The procedure, however, has never been 
used and is unlikely to be employed in the future because such an empowering of the EU Committee 
would enhance its status both legally and practically, compared to the other committees (Hölscheidt 
2001, 129). All in all, however, the constitutional changes gave the Bundestag the potential to really 
influence European affairs and diminished the Pre-Maastricht misfits. In practice, the actual 
influence of the Bundestag is still hampered by party loyalty and continued consensus on EU affairs 
and the Bundestag is seen by someas merely a ‘supportive scrutinizer’ (Hölscheidt 2001, 140).  
3.4.3 Systemic and Intra-institutional Change in Germany   
In Germany changes on the systemic level can be observed only in conjunction with the 
constitutional adaptation prior to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In relation to the 
constitutional misfit of a missing scrutiny system important changes have been introduced to counter 
the democratic deficit. These far reaching adaptations, however, did not change the parliamentary 
system as such. Unlike the British case the adaptations of the German system took place within the 
institutional logic of strong counter-players to the government. In this respect the constitutional 
amendments introduced in the early 90s represented a system-conform response which was 
prevented beforehand by the remarkably strong cultural mediating factor of a pro-European 
Seite 14 von 21 EIoP: Text 2002-015: Full Text
30.09.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-015.htmpermissive consensus.  
Regarding the adaptation process of the Bundestag’s internal working modes, the pressure for change 
was low, because of the strong tradition for committee work. The various Committees introduced 
before the 90s could be integrated without altering the internal working procedures decisively. Thus, 
it is remarkable that the EU Committee, even in the absence of a specific adaptational pressure, was 
provided with such an outstanding position. The possibility of the EU Committee to represent the 
Bundestag as a whole was a constitutional novelty. This constitutes a very specific case in which 
remarkable intra-institutional change occurred in the absence of a concrete adaptational pressure.  
4 Conclusions   
The aim of this article was to develop, on the basis of existing Europeanization approaches, an 
improved framework for the comparative analysis of the adaptation processes of domestic polities 
and to test it in a comparative case study. The empirical observations have shown that the changes in 
the parliamentary systems in Germany and the UK can be explained by applying the concepts of 
misfit, adaptation pressure, mediating factors and domestic change present in the Europeanization 
literature. However, an adaptation of these concepts to the needs of a polity analysis was necessary in 
order to grasp the relevant dynamics in the development of the two parliamentary systems.  
The break-down of the rather undefined concept of misfit into three sub-categories showed that 
inherently different adaptational pressures were at work, not only in the two countries but also within 
each of the two parliamentary systems. In Germany for example, the constitutional misfit has to be 
regarded as enormous prior to Maastricht whereas the functional and the cultural misfits were 
minimal. In Britain, on the other hand, the functional and cultural misfits were huge whereas there 
was a rather ambiguous picture regarding the constitutional adaptational pressure. The notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty proofed to be incompatible with the Europeanization process and the 
adaptational pressure was therefore relentless prior to Britain’s accession. The pressure on the 
government-parliament relation by the Europeanization-induced strengthening of the government 
was rather low, on the other hand, since it only reinforced the already existing asymmetry.  
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Thus, very different adaptational pressures had to be considered analysing the influence of the 
various mediating factors that finally shaped the reactions of the two parliamentary systems. The 
employment of the concept of mediating factors, however, showed the limits of the analytical 
framework. Whereas the empirical analysis demonstrated that rational as well as sociological 
institutionalist mediating factors exerted their influence at the same time, it was not possible to 
generalise whether or when they worked in favour or against domestic change. This contradicts 
partly the findings of Risse et. al. who conceptualise e.g. political culture only as a facilitating factor 
and argue for a distinction between mediating formal institutions and veto-points, which did not find 
support in our analysis. Thus, the explanatory reach of the framework remains rather limited since it 
can only indicate the important determinants for or against change, but cannot generalise about their 
influence.  
Another unresolved question remains, which of the mediating factors prevails when they are pulling 
in different directions. One important finding has been that the cultural mediating factor - the attitude 
towards European Integration - proved to be dominant, even if it played opposite roles in the two 
countries. Whereas the ‘permissive consensus’ on European integration prevented the Bundestag 
from putting sufficient pressure on the government and thus prevented domestic change for decades, 
the Euro sceptic culture was the strongest weapon for the House of Commons’ backbenchers in their 
pursuit of better scrutiny rights. The influence of this cultural mediating factor was partly 
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national courts facilitated the departure from the principle of parliamentary sovereignty against the 
fierce opposition from Euro-sceptics in both of the parties. In Germany, it was the Constitutional 
court that finally pressed the Government, as well as the Parliament, to revise the existing scrutiny 
procedures and to introduce far reaching constitutional amendments. The only generalisation 
possible is the fact that the cultural mediating factors accounted for the longer-term tendencies and 
the mediating formal institutions were responsible for the more sudden polity changes. The countries 
thereby followed a reverse pattern. Whereas very little happened in the Bundestag for the first 35 
years of European integration, the House of Commons were endowed with a scrutiny system from 
the early years of membership. On the other hand the scrutiny system in the Commons only 
developed marginally from its initial starting point, whereas the scrutiny rights in the Bundestag got 
a substantial boost around the creation of the TEU.  
Finally, the analysis stressed the importance of having clear indicators and categories for domestic 
change. The introduction of the notions of systemic and intra-institutional changes allowed 
distinguishing between changes that simply altered the working modes of the analysed institutions 
and those who altered the parliamentary systems at large. In the UK, systemic changes could be 
observed especially in the departure from the century-old principle of parliamentary sovereignty that 
was at least partly compensated by the constitutional novelty of formal ratification rights. This also 
indicates that parliamentary adaptation processes cannot sufficiently be explained by path 
dependency and incrementalism as done by Dimitrakopoulos (2001). The same is true for Germany. 
Important constitutional changes were introduced prior to the Maastricht Treaty and especially the 
standing of the new EU committee can be regarded as an remarkable constitutional innovation in the 
scrutiny process. The changes, however, did not alter the logic of the consensus oriented 
parliamentary system with strong counterweights to the government. Thus, the adaptation process in 
the UK had greater repercussions on the political system as a whole, but also on the intra-
institutional level. Whereas existing intra parliamentary working methods in the Bundestag where 
mostly just adapted the institutionalization of the committee work within the British Parliament 
meant a decisive move away from a strictly chamber-oriented parliamentary work.  
All together, the comparative case study has shown that the adaptation of the framework has brought 
analytical gains; gains that might be exploited in analyses of the Europeanization of other institutions 
as well. The real challenge will be to develop further generalizations or even causal relationships 
between the core categories of the Europeanization approach that go beyond the scope of single case 
studies.  
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be classified according to three different understandings of the term (Marcussen, (2002), 
(2002forthcoming): Europeanization as European institutionalisation, Europeanization as change 
mechanisms (Knill / Lehmkuhl (1999)) and Europeanization as second-image reversed (Peter 
Gourevitch (1978)). An alternative categorisation is developed by Olsen (2001) who distinguishes 
between five different phenomena. 
(2) Only Dimitrakopoulos (2001) takes up the question of the influence of European Integration on 
domestic institutions in regards to national Parliaments. From an historical institutionalist perspective 
he explains the development only in terms of ‘incrementalism’ and ‘path dependency’. 
(3) For a conceptualization of the feedback loops on the European level, see Börzel (2002). 
(4) Dimitris N. Chryssochoou talks about ‘The parliamentary decline thesis’ regarding the 
”asymmetrical evolution of the powers of Western European executive and legislative institutions 
since the early days of this century”, Chryssochoou (1998), 107. The ‘modernisation’ thesis claims 
that ”the sheer complexity, technical knowledge, and sectorisation characteristic of modern decision-
making make representative bodies ill-suited to exercise any effective influence on governments”, 
Raunio / Hix (2000), 148. 
(5) To the increase in legislative output and areas covered, see: Maurer / Wessels (2001), 39-45. 
(6) Saalfeld (1998), 60. Not all authors share this view on the committee system. Holzhacker claims 
that the formal committee structure of the Bundestag is not as much an area of scrutiny b y the 
parliament as by the opposition parties, and that the governing parties’ goal in the scrutiny procedure 
solely is to protect and strengthen the government, Holzhacker (2001), 10. 
(7) On the theoretical origins of the mediating factors, see : Börzel/Risse (2000).  
(8) Resolution of the House of 24 October 1990, in Rogers (1995), appendix C. 
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